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INTRODUCTION
On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian man named Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab unsuccessfully attempted to blow up an airplane as it
was landing in Detroit.1  When FBI agents interrogated Abdulmutal-
lab, he told them that Anwar Al-Aulaqi, an American citizen living in
Yemen, had directed Abdulmutallab to detonate a bomb over U.S.
soil.2  U.S. officials had previously investigated Al-Aulaqi, particularly
for his online videos in which he incited his followers to commit acts
of terrorism on U.S. soil.3  Abdulmutallab’s confession, however,
piqued the U.S. intelligence community’s interest in Al-Aulaqi.4
Following Abdulmutallab’s testimony, the Department of Justice
wrote a memo justifying the targeted killing of Al-Aulaqi.5  Though
the U.S. government has routinely used drone missiles to kill aliens
living in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen, U.S. officials sought a
full analysis on the legality of killing Al-Aulaqi because he was a U.S.
citizen.6  The memo provided several justifications for the legality of
killing Al-Aulaqi, including that a targeted killing would not violate his
Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights.7
Before U.S. officials could kill Al-Aulaqi, his father sought to en-
join President Obama and other national security officials from au-
thorizing the killing.8  The District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the claim, holding that the case was nonjusticiable because
the court lacked a standard for reviewing this type of military decision
of the executive branch.9
Following the district court’s decision, several Reaper drones hit a
convoy in Yemen in which Al-Aulaqi was travelling and killed him.10
Politicians and legal scholars criticized the Obama administration’s
decision to kill Al-Aulaqi.  Senator Rand Paul filibustered the nomina-
tion of John O. Brennan for CIA director because Attorney General
Eric Holder refused to rule out drone strikes against U.S. citizens on
1 See Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES,






6 See Greg Miller, Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to
Kill Lists, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/
2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.html.
7 For a full analysis of the memo, see infra Part III.B.
8 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010).  For further analysis of
this case, see infra notes 194–202 and accompanying text.
9 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 47–52.
10 See Mazzetti et al., supra note 1. R
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U.S. soil.11  Scholars have criticized the decision, contending that “the
President does not have a ‘blank check’” to kill citizens.12
In July 2012, Al-Aulaqi’s estate sued Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, seeking a Bivens remedy based on an alleged deprivation of
Al-Aulaqi’s Fifth Amendment rights.13  In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution provided a
cause of action for monetary damages for constitutional deprivations
committed by federal officials.14  The Court noted that such remedies
are available, except if (1) Congress has provided an alternative rem-
edy or (2) “special factors counsel[ ] hesitation” against granting judi-
cial relief.15  Plaintiffs may receive a Bivens remedy for Fourth, Fifth,
and Eighth Amendment violations.16
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the es-
tate’s Bivens claim, holding that the case was nonjusticiable because
the judiciary should not intervene in national security matters.17
Al-Aulaqi’s U.S. citizenship gave the court “pause,” but his citizenship
ultimately did not affect the court’s analysis.18  A New York Times edito-
rial called the decision “poorly reasoned.”19  The two Al-Aulaqi cases
and reactions to them raise the question whether citizenship should
determine which victims of the “War on Terror”20 the government
protects and compensates.
This Note addresses whether courts in ruling on post-9/11 Bivens
litigation should consider a plaintiff’s citizenship,21 and whether citi-
11 See Ashley Parker, Rand Paul Leads Filibuster of Brennan Nomination, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
6, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/rand-paul-filibusters-
brennan-nomination/.
12 See, e.g., Samuel S. Adelsberg, Bouncing the Executive’s Blank Check: Judicial Review and
the Targeting of Citizens, 6 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 437, 438 (2012).
13 See Complaint at 15, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-cv-01192 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012).
For further analysis of this case, see infra Part I.B.1.
14 See 403 U.S. 388, 397–98 (1971).
15 Id. at 396–97.
16 See, e.g., id.; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24–25 (1980) (allowing a Bivens claim to
proceed against a prison warden who had allegedly subjected an inmate to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 230–31, 248–49 (1979) (allowing a Bivens claims to proceed based on alleged sexual
discrimination, which violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
17 See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *17–18 (D.D.C. July 18,
2012).
18 See id. at *16–17.
19 Dorothy J. Samuels, Do the Courts Have a Role to Play in Drone Strikes?, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2014, 12:31 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/do-the-
courts-have-a-role-to-play-in-drone-strikes/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
20 It should be noted that while this Note uses the term “War on Terror,” the Obama
administration has moved away from using the term.
21 Though a few scholars have discussed the issue of citizenship in the context of post-
9/11 damages litigation, most of these works have discussed the results of these lawsuits
and focused less on developing a normative theory for whether courts should treat aliens
differently from citizens. See Gwynne L. Skinner, Roadblocks to Remedies: Recently Developed
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zenship should be a relevant factor in determining which types of pro-
tections the government gives individuals before placing them on the
kill list.  More broadly, this Note analyzes the importance of citizen-
ship in the post-9/11 context.  I use post-9/11 Bivens cases and the
targeted killings program as case studies because these areas of na-
tional security law raise the same fundamental issues.  Both require
courts to determine the extent to which they should protect potential
victims of the War on Terror, either through providing monetary
compensation under Bivens or granting individuals procedural hear-
ings in the context of targeted killings.  Furthermore, both areas re-
quire balancing noncitizens’ and citizens’ rights against the United
States’ interest in maintaining an effective national security regime.
One may assume intuitively that U.S. officials should in particular
protect U.S. citizens who are victims of the War on Terror because the
U.S. government is fighting the War on Terror on behalf of its citi-
zens.  This Note, however, argues that citizenship should not be a fac-
tor in determining which victims should receive Bivens remedies or
which individuals are placed on the kill list.22  To reach this conclu-
sion, this Note develops a two-part argument.
First, I contend that courts and executive branch officials have
improperly concluded that constitutional rights do not extend to
aliens detained or killed abroad by U.S. authorities.23  In reaching this
Barriers to Relief for Aliens Injured by U.S. Officials, Contrary to the Founders’ Intent, 47 U. RICH.
L. REV. 555, 626 (2013) (concluding that the Founders wanted to ensure that aliens who
were victims of torts could seek redress in federal court); Elizabeth A. Wilson, “Damages or
Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene Constitution and Compensation for Human Rights Violations
After 9/11, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1491, 1514–16 (2011) (concluding that the Supreme
Court’s holding in Boumediene v. Bush has not altered the lower courts’ analysis in deciding
whether to extend Bivens remedies to noncitizens); Katrina Carmichael, Note, The Unconsti-
tutional Torture of an American by the U.S. Military: Is There a Remedy Under Bivens?, 29 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1093, 1120–26 (2013) (contending that when the plaintiff is an American citi-
zen, courts should either extend Bivens remedies or Congress should pass a statute provid-
ing monetary remedies).
22 While this Note implicitly argues that at least some of the victims of unlawful post-
9/11 torture committed by the U.S. government should be able to receive Bivens claims,
I leave to other commentators to delve more deeply into Bivens jurisprudence. Compare
Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255,
277 (2010) (contending that national security concerns never “furnish a special factor
counseling hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy” (quotation marks omitted)), with
George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 841, 848–49, 910–11 (2009) (positing that Congress, not federal courts, should deter-
mine the proper balance between individual liberties and national security), and Andrew
Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1125–26
(2014) (providing several justifications why lower courts have refused to grant Bivens reme-
dies in post-9/11 damages litigation).
23 See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (determining that the
Supreme Court’s Boumediene holding did not apply to bases in Afghanistan and Iraq be-
cause the United States did not exercise sovereignty over these bases); Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that while the United States has maintained “total
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conclusion, lower courts and executive branch officials have misinter-
preted the normative concerns behind the Supreme Court’s
Boumediene v. Bush opinion.  In Boumediene, the Court held that aliens
detained at Guanta´namo have a constitutionally guaranteed right to
habeas corpus review.24  The decision sought to prevent U.S. officials
from “switch[ing] the Constitution on or off” merely by detaining sus-
pected terrorists in foreign, rather than domestic, prisons.25  Based on
this concern underlying the Boumediene decision, I argue that U.S. offi-
cials cannot turn off constitutional protections for aliens merely by
detaining or killing aliens abroad.  Consequently, in light of
Boumediene, courts should hold that constitutional rights extend to
aliens that U.S. authorities plan to kill or detain abroad.
The second prong of this Note’s analysis is that aliens do not in-
herently pose a greater threat to national security.  The War on Terror
is distinct from a conventional war, such as World War II.  In World
War II, particular nation-states represented threats to U.S. national
security.  In the War on Terror, individuals, not nation-states, are the
enemy.  Thus, citizenship is a poor proxy for determining which indi-
vidual cases may implicate national security concerns.  A U.S. citizen
trained by al-Qaeda constitutes a greater threat to national security
than a Pakistani civilian whom the U.S. government mistakenly de-
tains.  Consequently, federal courts should not rely on citizenship to
determine which cases to dismiss, and U.S. officials in the targeted
killings context should not assume that an alien necessarily poses a
greater imminent threat to U.S. national security than a citizen.
Thus, citizenship should not be a factor in resolving post-9/11
national security issues.  Instead, courts and officials should employ a
fact-intensive approach before making national security decisions
such as dismissing a Bivens claim or placing an individual on the kill
list.
Part I discusses the most significant post-9/11 damages cases and
is divided between cases where the plaintiff was an alien and where
the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen.  This section highlights how courts
have treated plaintiffs differently based on their citizenship.  Part II
provides a two-part argument for why citizenship should not deter-
mine which plaintiffs receive damages.  Part III uses the analysis devel-
oped in Part II to analyze the U.S. targeted killings program.  In
particular, this section argues that because nationality serves as a poor
proxy for determining the United States’ enemies in the War on Ter-
ror, the U.S. government should use the same fact-intensive proce-
control” over Guanta´namo for more than a century, the United States did not intend to
control Bagram indefinitely).
24 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
25 Id. at 765.
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dures before placing an individual, whether a citizen or an alien, on
the kill list.  Part III also suggests that a specialized court within the
executive branch should be set up to review kill list decisions.
I
POST-9/11 BIVENS LITIGATION
Bivens jurisprudence has received renewed attention since 9/11
with the United States’ War on Terror generating numerous Bivens
suits.  Plaintiffs have primarily alleged that U.S. officials violated their
Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights during detentions and interroga-
tions that have generally occurred in U.S.-controlled military prisons
abroad.26  This section analyzes several of these cases and is divided
between cases where plaintiffs were aliens and where plaintiffs were
U.S. citizens.  Many commentators have determined that courts have
not treated citizen plaintiffs differently from alien plaintiffs because
no plaintiff has successfully received Bivens remedies in post-9/11
damages litigation.27
Courts, however, have treated plaintiffs differently based on their
citizenship.  When alien plaintiffs raise Bivens claims, courts have gen-
erally dismissed these claims for one of two reasons.  Some lower
courts have held that aliens do not have constitutional protections
when tortured abroad.28  The lower court decisions have suggested
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush did not im-
pact their analyses.29  A different group of decisions has held that na-
tional security constitutes a special factor that counsels hesitation
against granting Bivens remedies to alien plaintiffs.30  No district court
has recognized a Bivens cause of action for an alien plaintiff.31  Fur-
thermore, several district court decisions have recognized a cause of
action for U.S. citizens, but circuit courts have then dismissed those
26 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in only two post-9/11 damages cases.
See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666
(2009).
27 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 22, at 268–69 (noting the emergence of national secur- R
ity as a factor “counseling hesitation” (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971))).
28 See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that consti-
tutional protections do not extend to aliens detained in U.S. military prisons in Afghani-
stan or Iraq).
29 See infra Part II.A for an analysis of Boumediene.
30 See infra Part I.B.
31 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d
157 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), and
aff’d, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing an alien plaintiff’s claim because of national
security concerns).
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decisions on appeal on qualified immunity grounds without reaching
the constitutional merits of the cases.32
A. Alien Plaintiffs
1. El-Masri v. Tenet
Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen, alleged that in 2003 CIA
agents took him into custody in Macedonia, alleging that he was asso-
ciated with al-Qaeda.33  The agents then flew him to Kabul, detained
him for over a year, and tortured him.34  Officials had in fact mistaken
El-Masri for a similarly named terrorism suspect and he was
released.35
El-Masri brought a claim under Bivens for a due process violation
against several CIA agents based on America’s extraordinary rendition
program.36  The United States intervened into the case and moved to
dismiss based on the state-secrets privilege.37  The district court
granted the defendants’ motion because any admission or denial of
America’s extraordinary rendition program would “present a grave
risk of injury to national security.”38  The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the district court had properly applied the state-secrets
doctrine.39
2. Ali v. Rumsfeld
Nine plaintiffs, Iraqi and Afghani citizens, sued Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld and several lower-ranking military officers.40
32 See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 768–69 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing the district
court’s decision and dismissing on qualified immunity grounds a case brought by a U.S.
citizen).
33 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–33 (E.D. Va. 2006).
34 See id. at 534–35.
35 See Wells Bennett, El-Masri Awarded Damages by ECHR, LAWFARE (Dec. 13, 2012,
10:22 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/el-masri-awarded-damages-by-echr/.
36 See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534–35.
37 See id. at 535.  The state-secrets doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that the govern-
ment may assert to protect information that it considers important to national security. See
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1953); Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding: The
New Secrecy Doctrine So Secret You Don’t Even Know About It, SLATE (May 22, 2006, 3:57 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/05/secret_guard
ing.html (discussing how the Department of Justice’s invocation of the state-secrets privi-
lege increased during the Bush administration).
38 El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
39 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007).
40 See In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C.
2007).  The specific allegations included one plaintiff being “anally probed multiple times,
stripped naked in front of other people and photographed, and forced to wear blackout
goggles and sound-deadening headphones for prolonged periods to induce sensory depri-
vation.” Id. at 89.  The suit gained public prominence in the wake of leaked photos of
military officials abusing detainees at the Abu Ghraib military prison in Iraq. See, e.g.,
Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib: American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far Up Does
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The plaintiffs alleged that U.S. officials tortured them while detaining
them at either the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or one of the various
U.S. controlled prisons in Afghanistan.41  All plaintiffs were eventually
released, and they subsequently brought a Bivens claim based on Fifth
and Eighth Amendment violations.42  The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, observing that the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments “do[ ] not apply extraterritorially to nonresident aliens
detained in Iraq and Afghanistan where the United States lacks sover-
eignty and is engaged in a war.”43  To reach this conclusion, the opin-
ion relied on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush.44  The
opinion also stated that if aliens could bring these types of claims,
enemies could use the discovery process to obtain information about
“military affairs.”45
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the Supreme Court’s re-
versal of the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Boumediene v. Bush created the
possibility that constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension
Clause, may apply extraterritorially to aliens.46  The D.C. Circuit, how-
ever, upheld the district court decision on two separate grounds.47
First, the circuit court held that despite the Supreme Court’s holding
in Boumediene, nonresident aliens, detained in Afghanistan and Iraq,
still lacked Fifth and Eighth Amendment constitutional protections.48
The circuit court reasoned that because the United States did not per-
manently exercise sovereignty over military bases in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, constitutional protections did not extend extraterritorially to
these places.49  Second, granting a trial in this case “would hamper the
war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.”50
3. Rasul v. Myers
Four British plaintiffs claimed that while detained at Guanta´-
namo, U.S. officials repeatedly beat and tortured them.51  These plain-
the Responsibility Go?, THE NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004), http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact?currentPage=1.
41 See In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
42 See id. at 88, 91.
43 Id. at 94.
44 See id. at 95–102.  The Supreme Court later overturned the D.C. Circuit’s holding
in Boumediene v. Bush. See 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).  For an analysis of the Supreme Court’s
Boumediene decision, see infra Part II.A.
45 See In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 104.
46 See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
47 See id. at 765, 772–74.
48 See id. at 771–74.
49 See id.
50 Id. at 773 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950)).
51 See Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Rasul v.
Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008),
and aff’d, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 9 18-MAR-15 8:32
2015] CITIZENSHIP AND THE WAR ON TERROR 741
tiffs raised a Bivens claim for deprivations of their Fifth and Eighth
Amendment rights.52  The district court reserved on the issue of
whether constitutional rights extended to aliens detained at Guanta´-
namo but dismissed the suit on qualified immunity grounds.53  On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that constitu-
tional protections did not extend to Guanta´namo detainees.54  The
Supreme Court, however, vacated this decision because of its
Boumediene decision.55  On remand, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the
claim based on qualified immunity grounds because the alleged tor-
ture occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision.56
B. American Plaintiffs
1. Doe v. Rumsfeld and Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta
In Doe v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff was working as a translator in Iraq
when NCIS agents detained him and allegedly “blindfolded him,
kicked him in the back, and threatened to shoot him if he tried to
escape.”57  Authorities eventually released him, and he returned to
the United States.58  He then filed a suit against Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld under a Bivens cause of action.59  Rumsfeld moved
to dismiss, but the district court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently
pleaded a substantive due process claim and thus might be eligible for
monetary damages.60  The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that special
factors relating to military, intelligence, and national security cau-
tioned against granting a Bivens remedy.61  The D.C. Circuit also
noted that Bivens decisions “d[o] not hinge on the plaintiffs’ citizen-
ship status” because U.S. “citizenship does not alleviate the . . . special
factors counseling hesitation.”62
The Doe v. Rumsfeld opinion is the leading case for the D.C. Cir-
cuit on post-9/11 damages claims raised by U.S. citizens.  When Anwar
Al-Aulaqi’s estate brought a Bivens claim against Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta for violating Al-Aulaqi’s Fifth Amendment rights, the
District Court for the District of Columbia relied heavily on the Doe
52 See id. at 39.
53 See id. at 40–44.
54 See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663–67 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
55 See Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083, 1083 (2008).
56 See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529–32 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that prior to the
Boumediene decision, “neither the Supreme Court nor this court had ever held that aliens
captured on foreign soil and detained beyond sovereign U.S. territory had any constitu-
tional rights—under the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or otherwise”).
57 Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
58 See id.
59 See id. at 392–93.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 394.
62 Id. at 396.
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precedent.63  In dismissing the Bivens claim raised by Al-Aulaqi’s es-
tate, the district court cited to Doe and held that “[u]nder binding
D.C. Circuit precedent, this Court finds that special factors preclude
the implication of a Bivens remedy here.”64
2. Padilla v. Yoo and Lebron v. Rumsfeld
Authorities arrested Jose´ Padilla, an American citizen, in early
May 2002 at Chicago O’Hare International Airport and subsequently
held him in federal custody in New York.65  On June 9, 2002, Presi-
dent Bush declared Padilla an “enemy combatant,” and U.S. officials
took Padilla into military custody.66  Officials held Padilla in military
custody for over three and a half years67 until a federal district court
convicted him of providing material support to terrorists.68
After his military detention, Padilla sued John Yoo, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel.69  The complaint alleged that Yoo wrote and promul-
gated several memoranda that led military officials to torture
Padilla.70  Yoo moved to dismiss the claim.71  The District Court for
the Northern District of California denied the motion because no fac-
tors counseled hesitation against granting a judicial remedy.72  The
opinion noted that unlike in cases where plaintiffs were aliens, foreign
relations concerns did not bar Bivens remedies for American citizens
suing on American soil.73  Yoo appealed.74
Before the Ninth Circuit ruled on Yoo’s appeal, Padilla sued Sec-
retary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials in the Dis-
63 See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *15 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2014).
64 Id. at *18.
65 Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2012).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See John Yoo, Litigating for Terrorists, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304746604577381841940350560.
69 Padilla, 678 F.3d at 751.
70 See Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013–16 (N.D. Cal. 2009), as amended (June
18, 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).  Padilla claims that government officials,
informed of Yoo’s memoranda, subjected him to interrogation tactics including “extreme
and prolonged isolation” and “sleep adjustment.” Id. at 1013. See also Memorandum from
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the
Dep’t of Def. 11 (Mar. 14, 2003) available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/
yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf (observing that “criminal statutes do not apply to the
properly-authorized interrogation of enemy combatants by the United States Armed
Forces during an armed conflict”).
71 Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
72 See id. at 1022–25.
73 See id. at 1029–30.
74 See Padilla, 678 F.3d at 757.
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trict Court of South Carolina.75  Padilla sought relief based on his
detention as an enemy combatant.76  The district court granted all the
defendants’ motions to dismiss, citing national security as a special
factor, which counseled hesitation against granting a judicial rem-
edy.77  Unlike the district court in Padilla v. Yoo, the court here held
that the case was factually similar to Ali v. Rumsfeld because granting
discovery in both cases could potentially allow “our enemies to obtain
valuable intelligence.”78  By comparing Padilla to the plaintiffs in
these two other cases, the South Carolina district court was implicitly
suggesting that citizenship did not determine whether a plaintiff
could successfully obtain Bivens remedies.  Furthermore, this opinion
suggested that suits brought by U.S. citizens could also raise national
security concerns.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that national
security concerns counseled hesitation against granting a Bivens rem-
edy in this case.79  The Fourth Circuit worried that allowing discovery
would hamper the work of national security officials.80
Following the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Lebron v. Rumsfeld, the
Ninth Circuit in Padilla v. Yoo dismissed all claims against Yoo.81  The
Ninth Circuit did not hold that Padilla was barred from a Bivens rem-
edy.82  Rather, the court dismissed the case on qualified immunity
grounds for two reasons.83  The opinion noted that when Yoo was
working at the Department of Justice, no judicial opinion had held
that U.S. citizen enemy combatants “possessed rights against the kind
of treatment to which Padilla was subjected.”84  Instead, the Supreme
Court had held that American enemy combatants could receive worse
treatment than ordinary prisoners.85  The Ninth Circuit then noted
that if Padilla’s alleged treatment had occurred today, it would have
constituted torture.86  During Yoo’s tenure, however, the law was
75 See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 794 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540
(4th Cir. 2012).
76 See id. at 794.
77 Id. at 800.
78 Id. at 799.
79 See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 551, 562 (4th Cir. 2012).
80 See id. at 551.
81 Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 769 (9th Cir. 2012).
82 See id. at 759–61.
83 See id. at 768.
84 Id. at 759.
85 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942); see also Padilla, 678 F.3d at 760 (interpret-
ing Ex parte Quirin to hold that an American citizen who was “detained as an unlawful
combatant could be afforded lesser rights than ordinary prisoners or individuals in ordinary
criminal proceedings”).
86 See Padilla, 678 F.3d at 767–68.
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unclear on whether Padilla’s alleged treatment constituted torture.87
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit did, however, suggest that courts
could not hold national security officials liable for torturing citizen
enemy combatants.
3. Vance v. Rumsfeld
Two U.S. citizens, who were working as private defense contrac-
tors in Iraq, sued Donald Rumsfeld after U.S. military officials alleg-
edly tortured them while detaining them in a U.S. military prison in
Iraq.88  Plaintiffs alleged that military personnel employed “physically
and mentally coercive tactics” to question plaintiffs before ultimately
releasing without charging them.89  In a short decision, the district
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.90  The Seventh Cir-
cuit initially affirmed the district court’s decision.91
Rumsfeld requested a rehearing en banc, which the Seventh Cir-
cuit granted.92  Following the en banc rehearing, the Seventh Circuit,
in an 8–3 decision, reversed the merits-panel decision.93  The opinion
held that foreign relations concerns counseled hesitation against
granting a Bivens remedy.94  For the majority, the plaintiffs’ citizen-
ship was not relevant because “it should be offensive to our own prin-
ciples of equal treatment, to declare that this nation systematically
favors U.S. citizens over . . . our [ ] allies.”95  Thus, the majority wor-
ried that if courts granted special protections to U.S. citizens, those
protections would offend U.S. allies in the War on Terror and have
negative consequences on foreign relations.
For the dissent, citizenship was a dispositive factor in determining
which types of plaintiffs should receive remedies under Bivens.96  The
dissent argued that if the U.S. government deprived aliens of their
rights, “they can turn to their home governments to stand up for their
87 See id. at 763–64, 767; see also Michael W. Lewis, A Dark Descent into Reality: Making
the Case for an Objective Definition of Torture, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 82–83 (2010) (not-
ing that there is agreement that the definition of torture generally is the intentional inflic-
tion of mental or physical pain, but “there is very little consensus on what that definition
actually means”).
88 See Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-C-6964, 2009 WL 2252258, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. July 29,
2009), rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), opinion vacated and rev’d on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d
193 (7th Cir. 2012).
89 Id.
90 See id. at *6.
91 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 611 (7th Cir. 2011).
92 See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
93 See id. at 197.
94 See id. at 200, 205.
95 Id. at 203.
96 See id. at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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rights.”97  Other governments, however, would not stand up for U.S.
citizens’ rights.98
C. Case Law Summary
Lower courts have not developed a uniform approach for ad-
dressing these post-9/11 damages suits.  With a few exceptions, the
courts have treated plaintiffs differently based on their citizenship.
Most court decisions have substantially limited the possibility that an
alien plaintiff may eventually be able to successfully obtain a monetary
remedy under Bivens.  Courts appear less wary of plaintiffs who are
U.S. citizens raising similar claims.  For these claims, courts have re-
lied on qualified immunity for dismissal.  These holdings suggest that
a U.S. citizen may eventually be able to win a post-9/11 damages suit.
II
ANALYSIS OF BIVENS LITIGATION
Thus, courts have treated Bivens claims from plaintiffs who are
citizens more favorably than Bivens claims from noncitizens.  Courts
should not, however, treat citizens and aliens differently when deter-
mining who should receive Bivens remedies.  Circuit courts have devel-
oped two improper lines of argumentation to treat citizens and aliens
differently.  First, opinions such as Ali v. Rumsfeld, which held that due
process protections do not apply to aliens detained in U.S. military
prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, have misinterpreted the Supreme
Court’s underlying policy concerns in the Boumediene opinion.99  In
Boumediene, the Supreme Court attempted to stop the U.S. govern-
ment from denying aliens constitutional protections by detaining
them overseas.100  Consequently, the spirit of Boumediene dictates that
aliens receive Fifth and Eighth Amendment protections while de-
tained in U.S. military prisons abroad.
Second, opinions that state that Bivens claims raised by aliens im-
plicate national security concerns counseling hesitation against grant-
ing a judicial remedy have erred in their analysis.101  Courts are
correct to hold that for certain Bivens claims, national security con-
cerns counsel hesitation against granting a judicial remedy.  Relying
on a plaintiff’s citizenship, however, is not an effective method for
protecting national security because in the War on Terror, individu-
97 Id. at 221.
98 See id.
99 See 649 F.3d 762, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
100 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
101 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576–77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding
that national security was a factor counseling hesitation against granting a Bivens remedy to
an alien).
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als, rather than nations, present threats to national security.  A U.S.
citizen trained by al-Qaeda, such as Jose´ Padilla, poses a greater threat
to national security than an alien, such as Khaled El-Masri, whom U.S.
officials mistakenly detained.  Thus, in determining whether to dis-
miss a Bivens claims because of national security concerns, courts must
not rely on a plaintiff’s citizenship to rule on a claim.  Instead, courts
must investigate whether allowing a particular claim to proceed to the
discovery stage would implicate national security matters.
A. Boumediene and the Extraterritorial Constitution
Before explaining why lower courts, in ruling on post-9/11 dam-
ages litigation, have misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, a brief discussion of the decision is necessary.
Boumediene involved a Bosnian citizen, Lakhdar Boumediene, whom
U.S. military officials seized in Bosnia and transferred to Guanta´namo
Bay.102  Boumediene then filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging his
detention.103  In defending Boumediene’s detention, the Bush admin-
istration had argued that neither U.S. constitutional law nor interna-
tional law applied at Guanta´namo.104  The D.C. Circuit denied
Boumediene’s writ, holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to
review habeas corpus petitions from alien detainees at
Guanta´namo.105
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reversed the lower
court’s decision.106  For Kennedy, constitutional protections for aliens
did not necessarily stop where the United States’ de jure sovereignty
ended.107  Consequently, Kennedy determined that, in certain situa-
tions, aliens detained abroad might receive rights under the Suspen-
sion Clause.108  Kennedy specifically worried about the following
implication if constitutional protections did not extend beyond where
the United States had de jure sovereignty:
[I]t would be possible for the political branches to govern without
legal constraint. . . . To hold the political branches have the power
to switch the Constitution on or off at will . . . would permit a strik-
ing anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a
regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say
what the law is.109
102 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
103 See id.
104 See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 190 (2009).
105 See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
106 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
107 See id. at 755.
108 See id. at 755–56.
109 Id. at 765 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
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Instead of a bright-line territorial test that rested on formalism,
Kennedy used a practical test to determine the reach of the Suspen-
sion Clause.110  Kennedy’s test focused on three factors: (1) the de-
tainees’ citizenship and enemy-combatant status, and whether the
status was in dispute; (2) the nature of the sites where officials appre-
hended and detained the detainee; and (3) the obstacles involved in
resolving the prisoner’s writ.111  Kennedy noted that Boumediene’s
status was in dispute.112  He then noted that the United States has
retained sovereignty over Guanta´namo indefinitely and so the Consti-
tution applied there.113  Finally, he argued that hearing the peti-
tioner’s claim would not compromise the military mission at
Guanta´namo.114
Since Kennedy announced the Boumediene decision, lower courts,
especially the D.C. Circuit, have read the Court’s holding narrowly.115
First, lower courts have limited the impact of Boumediene by holding
that the Court’s decision applies only to writs of habeas corpus and
not to due process claims.116  Second, lower courts have held that the
holding of Boumediene applies to Guanta´namo but not other foreign,
American-controlled detention facilities.117
Such a crabbed reading of Boumediene improperly ignores the
spirit and underlying policy concerns of the opinion.  A proper and
broader reading of Boumediene suggests that aliens detained at U.S.
military prisons abroad have the same Fifth and Eighth Amendment
protections as similarly situated U.S. citizens.
Lower courts have erred in holding that the analysis in Boumediene
applies only to the Suspension Clause.118  The opinion did not merely
give alien enemy combatants the right to challenge their detention in
the habeas context.119  More broadly, the opinion undermined the
assumption that U.S. officials working abroad may choose to afford
110 See id. at 766.
111 Id.
112 See id. at 766–68.
113 See id. at 768–69.
114 See id. at 769–70.
115 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
1451, 1456 (2011) (contending that the D.C. Circuit is “subverting” the Boumediene hold-
ing); Wilson, supra note 21, at 1516 (2011) (“In the world of damages, Boumediene changed R
little.”).
116 See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1026–28 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated
and rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 131 (2010) (per curiam).
117 See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (determining that the
Boumediene holding did not apply to bases in Afghanistan and Iraq because the United
States did not exercise sovereignty over these bases); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
118 See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1032.
119 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33.
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fewer constitutional protections to aliens than to U.S. citizens.120  As
Ronald Dworkin has persuasively argued, the Constitution’s protec-
tions against unjust imprisonment are interlinked and so “[i]t makes
little sense to think that aliens have full constitutional rights to habeas
corpus without also assuming that they have the rest of the due pro-
cess rights the Constitution has been understood to grant.”121  Apply-
ing Boumediene only to the Suspension Clause leads to the bizarre
result that detained aliens can successfully petition for release from
unlawful detention but cannot sue for any torture they suffered while
unlawfully detained.
Lower courts have also improperly determined that the holding
of Boumediene applies to aliens only when detained at Guanta´namo.122
Kennedy, in emphasizing the unique history of Guanta´namo,123 may
not have imagined that his opinion could include other U.S.-
controlled foreign military prisons.  In analyzing the policy concerns
that Kennedy addressed, however, U.S. officials’ actions at other for-
eign military prisons must also fall within the jurisdictional scope of
federal courts.  Kennedy worried that if the Suspension Clause did not
extend to Guanta´namo, then executive and legislative branches would
“have the power to switch the Constitution on or off” by moving for-
eign detainees from the United States to Guanta´namo.124
If the Boumediene opinion applied only to Guanta´namo, then U.S.
officials could “switch the Constitution on or off” by flying aliens de-
tained at Guanta´namo to other foreign U.S.-controlled military pris-
ons.  As Kal Raustiala has noted, Kennedy’s focus on practicality
suggests that the Boumediene holding is “subject to change given tech-
nological and political developments.”125  Government officials may
not escape liability merely by finding new places to torture individu-
als.126  Thus, lower courts that have argued that Boumediene is limited
to Guanta´namo are improperly imposing a bright-line test rather than
utilizing Kennedy’s flexible, practical test.
120 See Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/aug/14/why-
it-was-a-great-victory/.
121 Id.
122 See Ali, 649 F.3d at 772–74.
123 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69.
124 Id. at 765.
125 See RAUSTIALA, supra note 104, at 216. R
126 See Dworkin, supra note 120 (arguing that Kennedy’s “functional” standard means R
that “the president cannot escape his constitutional responsibilities by finding some spot
on a map to hold those he wants to torture that is fully controlled by but not leased to the
US”).
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Furthermore, a detention facility such as the Bagram military
prison127 in Afghanistan or Abu Ghraib in Iraq meets the second fac-
tor of Kennedy’s three-part Boumediene test.128  Though the United
States never intended to lease Bagram indefinitely, when these Bivens
claims arose U.S. officials controlled Bagram and Abu Ghraib in a
manner similar to Guanta´namo.129  In examining “the nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place,”130 courts
should recognize that the relationship between U.S. officials and alien
detainees was similar at Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and Guanta´namo.  Con-
sequently, the D.C. Circuit erred in its Ali v. Rumsfeld decision by hold-
ing that Boumediene did not apply to detention facilities in Afghanistan
and Iraq because the United States did not exercise sovereignty over
these facilities.131  In future litigation, courts should recognize that
Boumediene requires that courts grant Fifth and Eighth Amendment
rights to aliens detained at U.S.-controlled detention facilities.
Critics of this reading of Boumediene may argue that even if this
reading is proper, federal officials deserve qualified immunity because
their actions at the time of the alleged incidents did “not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.”132  Courts may
arguably grant individuals such as Donald Rumsfeld and John Yoo
qualified immunity.  These courts, however, should first rule on the
constitutional question and then determine whether these officials
violated “clearly established” rights.133  Thus courts, such as the D.C.
127 In 2009, U.S. officials opened up a new prison at the Bagram Air Base, which U.S.
officials referred to as the Parwan detention facility. See Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New
Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, at A8, available at  http://www.ny
times.com/2009/11/16/world/asia/16bagram.html?ref=bagramairbaseafghanistan&gwh=
A8D92D61CE3AAB3941C087B32D2D7135&gwt=pay.
128 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766–68.
129 See Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 483 (2010) (noting that the United States previously had
complete and exclusive control over Bagram and the terms of the Bagram Lease bore
striking resemblance to the Guanta´namo lease); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:
TRIALS OF BAGRAM AND GUANTA´NAMO DETAINEES IN AFGHANISTAN (2008), https://www.hu
manrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-080409-arbitrary-justice-exec-sum.pdf
(referring to Bagram as “[t]he [o]ther Guanta´namo”).  In March 2013, the United States
transferred control of nearly all of Bagram, including the Parwan detention facility, to the
Afghan government. See US Military Transfers Parwan Detention Centre to Afghan Government
Control, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2013, 6:39 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/mar/25/us-military-parwan-prison-afghanistan.  The United States still runs part of
the detention facility and has refused to hand over approximately fifty prisoners whom the
U.S. military captured outside of Afghanistan. See Jonathan Beale, Afghanistan: US Hands
Over Controversial Bagram Jail, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-19539412.
130 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
131 649 F.3d 762, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
132 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
133 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged; second, assuming the
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Circuit Court in Rasul v. Meyers, have erred in reserving on the issue of
whether Boumediene extends beyond Guanta´namo and dismissing
claims on qualified immunity grounds.134  By relying on qualified im-
munity rather than articulating a constitutional principle, courts have
thus far foreclosed alien plaintiffs from raising successful Bivens
claims.  By articulating a constitutional principle based on Boumediene
and then dismissing on qualified immunity grounds, courts could
shield individuals such as Rumsfeld and Yoo from liability based on
their past actions.  The lower courts could still, however, articulate a
proper reading of Boumediene and allow future alien plaintiffs to raise
successful Bivens claims.
B. The Individual and the Nation in the War on Terror
Circuit courts have also incorrectly dismissed Bivens claims citing
national security as a special factor “counseling hesitation” against
granting judicial relief to alien plaintiffs.135  When the plaintiff is a
U.S. citizen, however, circuit courts have not generally citied national
security as a special factor.136
Lower courts have erred in relying on a plaintiff’s citizenship to
determine whether the complaint implicates national security con-
cerns.  The War on Terror is distinct from previous, more conven-
tional wars because in the War on Terror, state armies do not
represent threats to national security.137  Instead individuals, with di-
verse citizenships, including U.S. citizens, are the threats to national
security.138
In conventional wars, such as World War II, citizenship served as
a justifiable basis for identifying potential national security threats.
violation is established, the question [is] whether the right was clearly established . . . .”);
see also Sarah L. Lochner, Note, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global
War on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 839 (2011) (observing that the Saucier opinion
clarified at least five times that a court must first consider the constitutional question
before ruling on a qualified immunity defense).  The Court did note in 2009 that this
ordering principle was optional even though the merits-first order remained “especially
valuable.” See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
134 See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529–32 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
135 See, e.g., id. at 532 n.5 (finding that an “alternative ground” for dismissing the suit
was the “danger of obstructing U.S. national security policy”); see also Benjamin Wittes,
Andrew Kent on Al Aulaqi and Bivens, LAWFARE (Aug. 3, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://www
.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/andrew-kent-on-al-aulaqi-and-bivens/ (arguing that lower
courts have been formally and informally recognizing a “national security exception” to
granting Bivens remedies).
136 Compare El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a
claim brought by an alien because of the government’s state-secrets privilege), with Kar v.
Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85–86 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing a claim brought by a U.S.
citizen on qualified immunity grounds).
137 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy
Responsibility, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1528 (2013).
138 See id. at 1525–30, 1565 n.158.
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Soldiers belonged openly to organized militaries that were under state
control.139  By joining an opposing army, individuals posed threats to
national security, not because of their actions but because they be-
longed to a particular state-based army.140
In quasi-conventional wars, such as the Cold War, citizenship
could arguably serve as a justifiable proxy for identifying potential na-
tional security threats.  Although the threat in the Cold War, commu-
nism, was not state-based, the threat originated from an enemy state,
the Soviet Union.141  Thus, at a superficial level, Congress had some
basis to fear that aliens from European nations sympathetic to com-
munism were more likely to be communist sympathizers them-
selves.142  Consequently, Congress used immigration and deportation
laws to deport aliens whom it believed posed national security
threats.143  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of
these deportation laws, noting that aliens may continue to harbor an
allegiance to their nation of origin and “[s]o long as the alien elects to
continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domicile here is held by a
precarious tenure.”144
Yet on closer inspection, these Cold War deportation laws did not
accurately identify aliens who posed national security threats.  For ex-
ample, in the 1952 case Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court
upheld a decision to deport a Greek national who had previously be-
longed to the Communist Party.145  Born in Greece in 1901, Peter
Harisiades lawfully immigrated to the United States as a teenager.146
He had worked as an organizer for the Communist Party in the 1920s
and 1930s but was dropped from the party’s membership in 1939.147
In 1944, while raising two American-born children, he applied for citi-
zenship.148  He was arrested at his Immigration Services interview and
subsequently deemed deportable based on his previous membership
in the Communist Party.149  Upon deportation, Poland granted
Harisiades asylum because he feared that the Greek government, now
ruled by a right-wing military dictatorship, would kill him.150  The
139 See id. at 1525.
140 See id. at 1526.
141 See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on
Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 78 (2004).
142 See id. at 78–82.
143 See id.
144 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952).
145 See id. at 581–82, 591.
146 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 203
(2007).
147 See id. at 203–04.
148 See id. at 204.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 205.
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Harisiades narrative demonstrates that Cold War laws, which relied on
citizenship to test for loyalty, resulted in deportations of lawful aliens
who had demonstrated ties to the United States.
In the War on Terror, citizenship serves as an even weaker proxy
than it did in the Cold War for identifying potential national security
threats.  The War on Terror has complicated the methods by which
officials can identify an individual’s allegiance.  Terrorists often do
not wear uniforms, become members of a party, or even swear an oath
of allegiance.151  They do not belong to a distinct nation-state but
rather consciously decide to fight for a particular ideology.152  Conse-
quently, U.S. citizens, such as Jose´ Padilla, are able to join enemy ter-
rorist groups.  Because in the War on Terror, state actors do not
represent direct threats to national security, courts have no reason to
differentiate between U.S. citizens and aliens.153  Rather, courts must
differentiate between individual plaintiffs based on the threats that
they pose to U.S. national security.154  If allowing a U.S. citizen’s Biv-
ens claim to proceed to discovery poses an identical threat to national
security as allowing an alien’s Bivens claim to proceed to discovery, the
court lacks a basis for dismissing only the alien’s claim based on na-
tional security concerns.
A potential reading of this argument would suggest that courts
should treat citizens and noncitizens the same by not allowing any
plaintiff’s claim to proceed to the discovery stage.  Some commenta-
tors might suggest that this approach would be in line with federal
courts’ general reluctance to interfere into military affairs.155  Courts
would, however, be misinterpreting the purposes behind Bivens if they
were to dismiss all plaintiffs’ claims. Bivens recognized that courts
could hold federal officials liable even if Congress had not provided a
statutory remedy.156  By refusing to recognize any post-9/11 Bivens
claims, courts would be allowing a large number of federal officials to
remain unaccountable for their unconstitutional actions.
Under the proposed framework of this Note, courts would no
longer recognize citizenship as a relevant factor and would focus more
on the nature of a plaintiff’s complaint by using a case-by-case analysis
to determine which cases to dismiss.  This case-by-case analysis would
151 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 137, at 1526–27. R
152 See Melanie J. Foreman, Comment, When Targeted Killing Is Not Permissible: An Evalu-
ation of Targeted Killing Under the Laws of War and Morality, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 921, 931
(2013).
153 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 137, at 1526–27. R
154 See id. at 1586, 1596–97.
155 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
156 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 395–97 (1971).
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require courts to examine complaints in more detail.  In examining
complaints, courts would be more likely to recognize that certain com-
plaints do not implicate national security matters.  Allowing certain
plaintiffs’ claims that their jailors beat and tortured them to proceed
to discovery would not necessarily result in U.S. officials having to
expose state secrets.  The facts necessary to prove such a claim would
be similar to those necessary when an inmate in a domestic prison
sues the warden for cruel and unusual punishment.157 U.S. officials, in
invoking the state-secrets privilege, have worried that publicizing
black-site detentions would undermine the War on Terror.158  Media
publications that expose treatment at detention facilities, such as Abu
Ghraib,159 do not necessarily undermine national security efforts or
provide enemy groups with operational secrets.  An article on a deten-
tion facility, such as Seymour Hersh’s expose´ on Abu Ghraib, may de-
scribe the general conditions of the facility and the treatment of
prisoners without divulging classified information about the facility.160
Consequently, state secrets do not seem to be implicated in the typical
post-9/11 damages case.
This framework also suggests that a court could dismiss, citing
national security concerns, a Bivens claim that a U.S. citizen raised but
allow a claim that an alien raised to proceed to the discovery stage.
For example, the District Court of South Carolina and the Fourth Cir-
cuit correctly concluded that national security concerns counseled
hesitation against allowing Jose´ Padilla’s suit to proceed to discov-
ery.161  Because of his alleged previous training with al-Qaeda,
allowing Padilla to investigate why officials decided to hold him as an
enemy combatant may have improperly exposed information regard-
ing how the U.S. government monitors al-Qaeda.  On the other hand,
allowing the plaintiffs’ case in Ali v. Rumsfeld to proceed to discovery
would not have enabled terrorist organizations to obtain information
about U.S. military affairs.162  Instead, the suit would have focused on
evidence of how low-ranking military officers tortured these plaintiffs.
Consequently, this de-emphasis on citizenship promotes the rights of
all individuals.  Rather than arbitrarily dismissing a complaint because
of the plaintiff’s citizenship, this approach begins by assuming that all
157 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–18 (1980) (allowing a Bivens claim to proceed
against a prison warden who had allegedly violated an inmate’s Eighth Amendment
rights).
158 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535–38 (E.D. Va. 2006).
159 See, e.g., Hersh, supra note 40. R
160 See id.; see also Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Trans-
parency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1040–42 (2008) (discussing the aftermath of the
leaked Abu Ghraib photos).
161 See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 799–800 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d
540 (4th Cir. 2012).
162 See 649 F.3d 762, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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victims of the War on Terror may receive Bivens remedies.  Victims
lose this access to a remedy only if grave national security concerns
require dismissing their claims.
III
APPLICATION TO THE TARGETED KILLINGS DEBATE
This two-pronged analysis also applies to another important area
of post-9/11 litigation, the United States’ targeted killings program.
Targeted killings address similar issues as those raised in post-9/11
Bivens litigation.  As in Bivens litigation, the issue is to what extent the
U.S. government should protect potential victims of the War on Ter-
ror.  While in Bivens, courts grant monetary damages post-deprivation,
the issue in the context of targeted killings is what protections individ-
uals should receive pre-deprivation.  Similar to Bivens litigation, U.S.
officials have been more inclined to grant greater protections to citi-
zens than to aliens on the kill list.
During the Obama administration, the United States’ targeted
killings program has received increased media attention.163  In partic-
ular, the media has spotlighted the Obama administration’s authoriza-
tion of the killing of U.S. citizens living abroad and has questioned
whether those killings are illegal.164  On the other hand, there has
been less scrutiny over the targeted killings of noncitizens.  Though
the legality of the targeted killings of U.S. citizens may appear novel,
the same issues that have arisen in post-9/11 Bivens litigation apply to
the targeted killings debate.
In this section of the Note I will argue that noncitizens and citi-
zens deserve equal due process protections before being subjected to
targeted killings.  The Obama administration has justified the
targeted killings program by arguing that targeted killings are acts of
self-defense against senior officials of terrorist groups that pose an
“imminent” threat of attack.165  Based on this standard, an individual’s
citizenship is irrelevant.  Before reaching this conclusion, this section
will briefly describe the United States’ targeted killings program and
U.S. officials’ justifications for the program.  This section will then
summarize the Obama Administration’s decision to kill Anwar
Al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen residing in Yemen, and the subsequent litiga-
tion over the decision to kill Al-Aulaqi.  Finally, this section will out-
line several proposals that the Obama administration could utilize to
163 See, e.g., Mazzetti et al., supra note 1 (describing various targeted military killings R
during the Obama administration).
164 See id.
165 Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.Justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/
2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
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ensure the due process rights of citizens and noncitizens on the kill
list.
A. Overview of the United States’ Targeted Killings Program
Following 9/11, the Bush administration adopted a secret policy
of targeted killings.166  White House officials now maintain a secret
“kill list” which lists individuals that that administration has deter-
mined are high value.167  Targets do not receive any formal notifica-
tion or due process protections before being killed.168  Between 2004
and 2013, U.S. officials conducted 370 total drone strikes in Pakistan
and killed between 2,080 and 3,428 individuals.169
Bush administration officials viewed targeted killings as an emer-
gency measure that would be used only for a finite period of time.170
During the Obama administration, the use of targeted killings became
a permanent component of the counterterrorism arsenal.171
Targeted killings have become so routine during the Obama adminis-
tration that officials have started streamlining the processes involved
in placing an individual on the kill list.172  Officials have recently de-
veloped a disposition matrix, which maps out plans for disposing of
terrorism suspects, including those residing beyond the reach of
drones.173  The disposition matrix suggests that the United States will
continue its targeted killings program even as it winds down its more
conventional military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Though international organizations, including the United Na-
tions, have questioned the legality of the targeted killings program,174
U.S. officials have defended the program’s legality.  In a 2010 speech,
Harold Koh, former legal adviser to the State Department, argued
that because the United States was engaged in an active war with orga-
nizations such as al-Qaeda, U.S. officials were “not required to provide
166 See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execu-
tions, 3–8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter
Alston Report].
167 See Targeted Killings, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/national-
security/targeted-killings (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill
List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
168 See Targeted Killings, supra note 167. R
169 See Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://natsec.new
america.net/drones/pakistan/analysis (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).




174 See Alston Report, supra note 166, at 9–12. R
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targets with legal process” before using lethal force.175  Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder has also argued that U.S. officials need not provide
notice to targets.  Holder has contended that the United States’
targeted killings are legal because the United States is acting in self-
defense against senior officials of enemy organizations who pose an
“imminent threat of violent attack.”176  Officials have emphasized the
benefits of the targeted killing program with Jeh Johnson, then De-
partment of Defense general counsel, contending that drone missiles
enabled the United States to “target military objectives with much
more precision . . . [so] that civilian casualties are minimized in carry-
ing out such operations.”177  Thus, targeted killings will likely remain
a cornerstone of the United States’ counterterrorism program.
B. Targeted Killings of U.S. Citizens
Though the U.S. government has regularly used drone missiles to
kill individuals living in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and other for-
eign countries,178 the most controversial aspect of the drone missile
program is the targeted killing of U.S. citizens living abroad.179  In
particular, the media and scholars have criticized the Obama adminis-
tration’s decision to kill Anwar Al-Aulaqi.180  Al-Aulaqi was a dual U.S.-
Yemeni citizen, residing in Yemen, who was allegedly a senior al-
Qaeda operative.181  U.S. officials accused Al-Aulaqi of recruiting
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab for a suicide mission.182  Abdulmutallab
eventually attempted to blow up an airplane on December 25,
2009.183  Following Abdulmutallab’s failed suicide mission, U.S.
175 Harold Hongju Koh, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
176 Holder, supra note 165. R
177 Jeh Charles Johnson, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Ad-
ministration, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-
speech-at-yale-law-school/.
178 See Miller, supra note 6. R
179 See, e.g., Nasser al-Awlaki, The Drone that Killed My Grandson, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2013, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/opinion/the-drone-that-
killed-my-grandson.html?_r=0; Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Debates Drone Strike on
American Terrorism Suspect in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/world/asia/us-debates-drone-strike-on-american-terror-
suspect-in-pakistan.html?_r=0; Charlie Savage, Relatives Sue Officials Over U.S. Citizens Killed
by Drone Strikes in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A7, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/07/19/world/middleeast/us-officials-sued-over-citizens-killed-in-yemen.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
180 See, e.g., Adelsberg, supra note 12, at 438 (contending that the President does not R
have a “blank check” to kill citizens (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
(2004))); Mazzetti et al., supra note 1.
181 See Mazzetti et al., supra note 1. R
182 See id.
183 See id.
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officials determined that Al-Aulaqi was an imminent threat to U.S. na-
tional security interests.184
Subsequently, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Legal
Counsel wrote a secret, fifty-page memorandum justifying the killing
of Anwar Al-Aulaqi even though he was a U.S. citizen.185  After con-
cluding that capturing Al-Aulaqi alive was not feasible, the memo pro-
vides several legal arguments for killing him.186  The memorandum
first notes that federal murder statutes were not relevant to the deci-
sion to kill Al-Aulaqi.187  The memorandum then contends that a fed-
eral statute prohibiting Americans from murdering other Americans
did not apply to the killing of wartime enemies in compliance with the
laws of war.188  Further, the memorandum concludes that the Presi-
dent had the authority to “use lethal force abroad” against “a United
States citizen who is part of the forces of an enemy organization.”189
Finally, the memorandum concludes that even though Al-Aulaqi, as a
U.S. citizen, was protected under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
the President could kill him prior to hearing in federal court because
Al-Aulaqi posed a “continued” and “imminent” threat to U.S. national
security.190
Following the circulation of the memorandum, Attorney General
Eric Holder justified the killing of U.S. citizens during a speech at
Northwestern University Law School.191  Holder noted that for the
“small number of United States citizens who have decided to commit
violent attacks against their own country from abroad . . . it’s clear that
United States citizenship alone does not make such individuals im-
mune from being targeted.”192  For Holder, the President did not
need to get permission from a federal court before killing a U.S. citi-
zen.193  The executive branch alone could make this determination.
Before U.S. officials could kill Al-Aulaqi, his father brought a suit
in the federal District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to
enjoin President Obama and other national security officials from
184 See id.
185 See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorney
General re: Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated
Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010), at 38–41, available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2014-06-23_barron-memorandum.pdf.
186 See id. at 12–41.
187 See id. at 12–19.
188 See id. at 20–30.
189 Id. at 23.
190 Id. at 39–42.
191 See Holder, supra note 165. R
192 Id.
193 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 26 18-MAR-15 8:32
758 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:733
authorizing the killing.194  The defendants moved to dismiss on sev-
eral grounds, including the political question doctrine.195
The district court held that the plaintiff’s claim was nonjusticia-
ble.196  The court held that there were “no judicially manageable stan-
dards by which courts can endeavor to assess the President’s
interpretation of military intelligence and his resulting decision—
based on that intelligence—whether to use military force against a
terrorist target overseas.”197  Furthermore, the court reasoned that
“decision-making in the realm of military and foreign affairs is textu-
ally committed to the political branches, and . . . courts are function-
ally ill-equipped to make the types of complex policy judgments that
would be required to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff’s claims.”198
Thus, the court’s reasoning mirrored the reasoning of the post-9/11
Bivens cases.199  Again, the judiciary remained wary of intervening into
the military decision-making process.
The court further held that Al-Aulaqi’s U.S. citizenship did not
bear on the outcome of the case.200  The court noted that the political
question doctrine did “not contain any ‘carve-out’ for cases involving
the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.”201  Once the president de-
termined that an individual, even a U.S. citizen, posed an imminent
threat to national security, the courts could not review this
determination.202
Following the court’s decision, several Reaper drones hit a con-
voy in Yemen in which Al-Aulaqi was traveling, and the drones killed
Al-Aulaqi.203  Politicians criticized the killing of Al-Aulaqi.  For exam-
ple, Senator Rand Paul led a thirteen-hour filibuster opposing the
nomination of John O. Brennan for CIA director after Paul received a
letter from Attorney General Eric Holder refusing to rule out drone
strikes against U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.204  Several legal scholars have
also criticized the Al-Aulaqi killing.  These scholars have argued that
Al-Aulaqi retained his due process rights, even though residing
abroad, and that U.S. officials violated these rights.205  In developing
194 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010).
195 Id.
196 See id. at 47–52.
197 Id. at 47.
198 Id. at 52.
199 For an analysis of post-9/11 Bivens cases, see supra Part II.
200 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
201 Id. at 51.
202 See id. at 52.
203 See Mazzetti et al., supra note 1. R
204 See Parker, supra note 11. R
205 See, e.g., Adelsberg, supra note 12, at 442; Mike Dreyfuss, Note, My Fellow Americans, R
We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 249, 282–83 (2012).
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these arguments, however, these scholars have not suggested that
targeted killings of noncitizens violate those individuals’ due process
rights.
C. The Individual and Targeted Killings
The reasoning developed in Part II applies equally to the targeted
killings debate, and consequently courts should not differentiate be-
tween citizens and noncitizens when ruling on the legality of the
targeted killings.  Legal scholars writing on targeted killings correctly
argue that U.S. citizens retain their constitutional rights even when
they are residing abroad.206  A broader and more accurate reading of
Boumediene suggests that noncitizens who are on the kill list should
also receive due process protections before being killed.  If nonci-
tizens do not receive due process protections before being killed, then
U.S. officials could effectively circumvent the Boumediene ruling by opt-
ing to kill high-value targets rather than capturing and detaining
these targets.  The underlying policy concern of Boumediene, however,
was to ensure that the U.S. officials could not escape liability through
technological and political developments.207  Thus, even if the Obama
administration opts to hold fewer suspected terrorists in military pris-
ons and instead increasingly uses drone missiles to kill them,
Boumediene dictates that the administration must continue to grant the
same level of due process protections to suspected terrorists whether
they are citizens or noncitizens.
More importantly, U.S. officials have no meaningful way to distin-
guish between citizens and noncitizens on the kill list.  As previously
discussed, the War on Terror is distinct from conventional or quasi-
conventional wars because individuals, rather than members of organ-
ized armies, present threats to U.S. national security interests.208  Indi-
viduals, even U.S. citizens, may become threats to national security
after they have joined belligerent groups such as al-Qaeda.  If the
United States’ interest in maintaining a targeted killings program is to
eliminate imminent threats, then no legal or moral justification exists
for granting greater legal protection to a citizen who poses a similar
threat as a noncitizen.209  As David Luban has correctly noted, “[i]f
206 See, e.g., Adelsberg, supra note 12, at 442. R
207 See supra Part II.A.
208 See supra Part II.B.
209 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 137, at 1586 (“[I]t is not at all clear why, in R
principle, an American citizen in the same overseas location who poses a threat identical to
that posed by a non-American should have greater legal protection.”).
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they are enemy belligerents, they can be targeted, regardless of their
nationality.”210
Some critics of this framework may suggest that it leads ultimately
to the conclusion that the U.S. government could treat similarly situ-
ated citizen and noncitizen targets equally by granting neither of
them due process protections.  The Al-Aulaqi v. Obama decision seems
to follow this framework.211  By ruling that the targeted killing pro-
gram was a nonjusticiable matter, the District Court was permitting
the executive branch to avoid granting due process protections to
both citizen and noncitizen targets.212
The Al-Aulaqi v. Obama decision, however, incorrectly deferred to
the executive branch.  In reaction to the public disapproval of the
Al-Aulaqi killing, President Obama acknowledged that U.S. officials
must impose a “high threshold” to using lethal force.213  Adherence to
this “high threshold,” however, is less likely if the president reviews
and authorizes all the targeted killings.
D. Options for Reviewing Authorized Targeted Killings
Two separate options exist for ensuring that kill list targets re-
ceive some type of adequate protection before being killed.  The first
is allowing relatives of targets to bring suits in federal district courts to
enjoin the U.S. government from killing these targets.  The second is
using specialized courts, similar to the United States Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court (commonly known as the FISA court), to
review the executive branch’s targeted killing decisions.
1. Article III Courts
One option would be for targets, generally through relatives, to
bring suits in federal court enjoining the United States from killing
them.  Though the District of Columbia District Court held in
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama that “courts are functionally ill-equipped to make
the types of complex policy judgments” necessary to adjudicate the
merits of Al-Aulaqi’s claim, judicially manageable standards do exist
for reviewing this type of presidential action.214  Eric Holder has ar-
gued that the United States uses targeted killings to eliminate individ-
210 David Luban, What Would Augustine Do?: The President, Drones, and Just War Theory,
BOSTON REV. (June 6, 2012), http://bostonreview.net/david-luban-the-president-drones-
augustine-just-war-theory/.
211 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 52 (D.D.C. 2010).
212 See id.
213 Barack Obama, Remarks of President Barack Obama, WHITE HOUSE (May 23, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-
obama.
214 727 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
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uals posing an imminent threat to U.S. national security.215  Federal
courts could review petitions to enjoin targeted killings under this
“imminence” standard and require the United States to prove that a
particular individual does pose an imminent threat to U.S. national
security.  In utilizing this framework, federal courts would not, how-
ever, differentiate between citizens and noncitizens in making this
determination.
Using a federal court does, however, raise the issue that the fed-
eral government might have to divulge state secrets regarding intelli-
gence operations to justify a targeted killing.  The Al-Aulaqi opinion
never reached the issue of the state-secrets privilege but did acknowl-
edge that the case could “expose military matters which, in the inter-
ests of national security, should not be divulged.”216  This state-secrets
privilege would, however, be implicated whether the target was a citi-
zen or noncitizen because both situations could potentially require
U.S. officials to disclose how they collected intelligence on a particular
individual or how they formulate the kill list.
2. Specialized Courts
To avoid this state-secrets issue, the government could create a
specialized drone court, which would review all executive decisions on
targeted killings, both of citizens and noncitizens, under a more fact-
intensive analysis.  One option would be to model this specialized
court on the current FISA court.  The FISA court is an eleven-member
court to which the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court appoints active
Article III judges for seven-year terms.217  The U.S. government makes
requests to the FISA court to obtain surveillance warrants for foreign
intelligence investigations.218  The surveillance warrants authorize the
U.S. government to engage in intelligence activities such as wiretap-
ping and collecting metadata.219  The FISA court conducts all its hear-
ings in secret, and its decisions are not public.220
In arguing that the government should establish a drone court
similar to the FISA court, a few commentators have proposed the
following model.221  Senate-confirmed Article III judges would sit on
215 See Holder, supra note 165. R
216 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,
10 (1953)) (quotation marks omitted).




220 See Support Oversight of the Secret FISA Court, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www
.aclu.org/support-oversight-secret-fisa-court.
221 See, e.g., Adelsberg, supra note 12, at 445–52 (suggesting that the government create R
a drone court based on the FISA model).
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this court.222  The government would present its case at a hearing,
and a state-appointed attorney, similar to a public defender, would
represent the targeted individuals.223  The judges would write opin-
ions, with any sensitive information redacted, in order to guide future
targeted killing decisions.224  This court would, however, be different
from an Article III court because the potential target would not re-
ceive notice of this hearing.225  The significant drawback to this type
of model is that Article III judges may lack the expertise and skills to
adjudicate issues surrounding targeted killings.  The adjudicators of a
drone court would ideally need national security expertise and the
ability to make fast decisions before, rather than after, the fact.
An even more compelling model would involve having a court
within the executive branch, rather than the judicial branch, that
would review kill list decisions.  The court’s adjudicators would be a
group of national security experts rather than the FISA court model
of using Article III judges.226  These experts would review the presi-
dent’s kill list decisions, ignoring the target’s citizenship, and write
nonpublic opinions that the congressional intelligence committees
would then review.227  These experts would have the requisite national
security knowledge and would be selected based on their ability to
review intelligence reports surrounding the proposed targeted killing
of an individual and then make decisions quickly.  Furthermore, as
national security experts, these adjudicators could review the presi-
dent’s kill list decisions from both a constitutional and public-policy
perspective.  Such a court would not consider the citizenship of the
target and instead make a fact-intensive determination on whether the
target should remain on the kill list.
CONCLUSION
Though some commentators have argued that courts will con-
tinue deferring to the executive branch regarding national security
matters,228 as the Al-Aulaqi litigation has demonstrated, individuals
will continue raising claims in federal courts seeking Bivens remedies
222 See id. at 446.
223 See id. at 447.
224 See id. at 446.
225 See id. at 447.
226 See Neal K. Katyal, Op-Ed., Who Will Mind the Drones?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at
A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/an-executive-branch-
drone-court.html (proposing that the executive branch house a drone court); Editorial, A
Court for Targeted Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2013, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/02/14/opinion/a-special-court-is-needed-to-review-targeted-killings.html?ref=
opinion.
227 See Katyal, supra note 226; see also A Court for Targeted Killings, supra note 226. R
228 See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 22, at 268–69 (contending that courts are recognizing R
“national security” as a factor “counseling hesitation” in Bivens cases).
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and trying to enjoin targeted killings.  Unless Congress passes an alter-
native statutory remedy providing monetary damages to victims of the
War on Terror,229 plaintiffs will continue bringing post-9/11 damages
claims under a Bivens cause of action.  In future post-9/11 damages
cases, courts should use a two-pronged analysis to reject the notion
that while U.S. citizens may raise a Bivens cause of action, aliens may
not.  First, courts should recognize that a proper reading of
Boumediene dictates that aliens detained in U.S. military prisons abroad
receive Fifth and Eighth Amendment protections.  Second, a claim of
an alien plaintiff does not necessarily implicate national security con-
cerns.  In the War on Terror, individuals, rather than nations, pose
threats to national security.  Consequently, courts must determine
whether the nature of a claim raised by a particular plaintiff threatens
national security.  Employing a case-by-case analysis would properly
balance national security interests against a plaintiff’s individual
liberties.
Similarly, in the targeted killings context, litigants will continue
seeking to enjoin the president from killing suspected terrorists.
Though much of the public outrage on targeted killings has focused
on the United States killing its own citizens without due process pro-
tections, both noncitizens and citizens merit due process protections
before being killed.  Based on the underlying principles of the
Kennedy opinion in Boumediene, U.S. officials cannot violate non-
citizens’ due process rights merely by killing them using drones mis-
siles rather than holding them in detention facilities such as
Guanta´namo.  More importantly, if the United States’ legal justifica-
tion for using drones is to kill terrorists that pose an “imminent
threat” to U.S. national security, then no meaningful basis exists for
distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens.  Individuals of any
nationality may pose an imminent threat.
Two potential solutions exist for ensuring that targets receive ade-
quate due process protections.  First, federal courts, rather than defer-
ring to presidential authority, could require that U.S. officials
demonstrate that a target is an imminent threat.  This solution is
somewhat problematic because it could require the government to di-
vulge state secrets.  A second, more preferable solution would be to
establish a specialized drone court.  In particular, a specialized drone
court composed of national security experts could be established
within the executive branch to review the president’s decisions to kill
both citizen and noncitizen targets.  Either solution would properly
229 See Carmichael, supra note 21, at 1120–22 (proposing that to address these types of R
claims, Congress should pass a statute either (a) modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 1983 or
(b) provide remedies only to U.S. citizens who are subject to torture by the U.S.
government).
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recognize that citizens and noncitizens can pose equally imminent
threats to national security, and thus the United States must grant
these individuals adequate due process protections before killing
them.
